In practice, principals and agents often enter into risky, uncertain contracts. Principals often take measures to reduce the effect of uncontrollable events on agents' compensation in an effort to increase principal and agent welfare. However, we provide evidence that contracting on uncontrollable factors can positively or negatively influence agents' ex post feelings of fairness depending on the state of nature realized. These findings hold even if the contract is completely objective in nature and is agreed upon by both parties ex ante. Specifically, using two experiments, we show that when a favorable state of nature is realized, agents believe their compensation is less fair if they are compensated according to a state-dependent contract that reduces the effect of the state of nature on their compensation-even if they accepted the contract and viewed it as relatively fair ex ante. Furthermore, we provide evidence that this perceived unfairness can lead agents to take actions (e.g., misreporting) that adversely affect principals' welfare. Combined, our evidence supports the notion that agents expect to be rewarded for uncontrollable factors that increase firm performance without being punished for uncontrollable factors that decrease firm performance.
I. INTRODUCTION
In practice, principals and agents typically cannot contract directly on agents' effort, resulting in performance-based contracts that, by necessity, impose risk on agents. In settings where outcomes are influenced by factors outside of the agents' control (e.g., whether the operating environment was relatively favorable or unfavorable), principals can reduce agents' risk exposure by offering contracts that adjust compensation based on the realized state of nature.
While this type of state-dependent contract reduces the risk imposed on agents, we draw on prior work in accounting and psychology to predict that these contracts can also cause agents to view their compensation as being unfair ex post-even if they agreed to the contract and did not expect the resulting compensation to be unfair ex ante. Specifically, we examine how agents' perceptions of the fairness of their performance-based compensation are influenced by (1) whether a favorable or unfavorable state of nature is realized and (2) whether the performancebased contract incorporates information about the state of nature to reduce its effect on agents' compensation.
Before accepting a contract, agents consider the risk that the contract imposes on them and how fairly they expect to be compensated given the terms of the contract (Lind 2001) . From a contracting perspective, any change in agents' fairness perceptions after contract acceptance should be driven by deviations from the accepted contract rather than by the state of nature realized or by the terms of the contract agents agreed to. However, from a psychological perspective, agents also consider the extent to which their ex post compensation accurately reflects their effort, ability, and contribution to the firm (Lind 2001) . Further, agents may exhibit a self-serving attribution bias such that they overestimate their contribution to good performance and underestimate their contribution to poor performance (for example, see Berger et al. 2016) .
If this is the case, when a favorable state of nature is realized, agents may view their realized compensation as being less fair if they are compensated according to a state-dependent contract that does account for the state of nature by decreasing the impact of the favorable state of nature on agents' compensation. Conversely, when an unfavorable state of nature is realized, agents may view their compensation as being less fair if they are compensated according to a stateindependent, or static, contract that does not account for the state of nature, allowing uncontrollable, unfavorable events to negatively impact their compensation. Finally, agents may evaluate the fairness of outcomes based, in part, on the degree to which those outcomes deviate from self-derived expectations of outcomes (Ordóñez, Connolly, & Coughlan, 2000; van den Bos et al., 1998) . Under a static contract, agents' compensation, on average, is likely to be predictably higher than expected when a favorable state of nature is realized and predictably lower than expected when an unfavorable state of nature is realized. In contrast, under a statedependent contract that reduces the effect of the state of nature on compensation, the magnitude of the expectancy violation is less dependent on the realized state of nature.
Understanding these effects is important because prior work indicates that perceived unfairness in compensation can result in lower job satisfaction and motivation (Cohen-Charash and Spector 2001; Colquitt et al. 2001) . Further, individuals who feel unfairly compensated often take compensatory or punitive actions to achieve greater equity (Carrell and Dittrich 1978; Henrich et al. 2004; Chen and Sandino 2012) . In practice, agents who ex post believe their compensation is unfair might take a variety of costly actions in order to achieve greater equity (e.g., misreport performance, reduce future effort, increase consumption of perquisites, etc.).
Combined, these effects are likely to reduce the welfare of principals and agents and could lead principals to subjectively reward agents when uncontrollable factors increase performance but not punish agents when uncontrollable factors decrease performance, consistent with empirical evidence (Garvey and Milbourn 2006, Bol and Smith 2011) .
We test our research questions using two experiments. In Experiment 1, we use a 2 x 2 between-subjects experiment in which participants are offered a performance-based contract to complete a task. All participants are provided with detailed information about the task and are informed that they will be randomly assigned either to a relatively easy or to a relatively difficult version of the task. Before learning the difficulty level of their task, half of the participants are offered a static contract that offers a piece rate that is independent of the state of nature. The other half of our participants are offered a state-dependent contract that reduces the effect of the state of nature on their compensation by providing a lower piece rate when the task is relatively easy and higher piece rate when the task is relatively difficult. Participants in both treatments rate how fairly they expect to be compensated and are given the opportunity to accept or reject the contract. Following contract acceptance, we manipulate whether a favorable or unfavorable state of nature is realized by varying whether the task is relatively easy or relatively difficult. Participants who accept the contract then complete the task, provide new fairness ratings, and respond to questions that measure the degree to which they believe internal vs. external factors contributed to their performance.
In Experiment 1, contract acceptance rates are identical across the static and statedependent contract conditions, suggesting that participants are willing to accept the risk associated with each contract and that both contracts offer compensation schemes that, on average, exceed participants' reservation wage for participating in the task. Despite these initial views, participants' ex post perceptions of fairness are influenced by the realized state of nature and by the form of the contract they accepted, even after controlling for their ex ante perceptions of fairness. Most notably, we find that participants who experience a favorable state of nature view their compensation ex post as being less fair when they are compensated according to a state-dependent contract. This finding is striking given that these participants are paid according to a contract that they accepted and which reduces the effect of uncontrollable factors on their compensation. Further, this effect is robust to controlling for the amount of compensation participants earn. Finally, we find evidence that participants exhibit a self-serving attribution bias as documented in prior work (e.g., Libby and Rennekamp 2012) , and that this bias influences participants' ex post fairness perceptions.
In Experiment 2, we explore a potential implication of the results from Experiment 1.
Specifically, we examine how agents' fairness perceptions influence individuals' tendency to misreport their performance. Experiment 2 uses the same experimental design as Experiment 1, but we also manipulate whether participants are permitted to misreport performance to increase their compensation. In addition to replicating our key findings from Experiment 1, results from Experiment 2 demonstrate that (1) participants' fairness perceptions are driven, in part, by ex post deviations from participants' ex ante expected compensation, and (2) participants' propensity to misreport performance is higher when they perceive their contractual compensation to be unfair ex post.
These findings contribute to the contracting literature by providing evidence that agents can feel unfairly compensated ex post, even when their compensation was based on an objective contract they accepted and considered to be relatively fair ex ante. In addition, we provide evidence that when a favorable state of nature is realized, agents actually view the resulting compensation as being less fair if they were compensated according to a state-dependent contract that reduces the impact of uncontrollable factors on agents' performance and compensation rather than a static contract that does not. To the extent that perceived unfairness leads agents to take compensatory or punitive actions to achieve greater equity (e.g., the performance misreporting demonstrated in Experiment 2), these effects can reduce the welfare of both principals and agents.
Our findings also complement the literature on "pay for luck." Recent work indicates that executives are rewarded for good luck but are not penalized for bad luck (e.g., Garvey and Milbourn 2006; Bol and Smith 2011) . While we do not directly test the role of fairness perceptions on pay for luck, our pattern of results suggests one benefit to this approach.
Specifically, by rewarding agents for good luck, agents will view their compensation as being more fair, potentially decreasing their propensity to take future actions that adversely affect principals such as misreporting performance, reducing future effort, or increasing consumption of perquisites.
II. THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
Prior work in psychology and behavioral economics suggests that fairness is an important social construct (e.g., Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler 1986a; Fehr and Schmidt 1999; Fehr and Gachter 2000; Falk, Fehr, and Fischbacher 2008) . For example, contrary to standard economic theory, dictators in dictator games generally allocate some of their payment to the recipient, presumably exhibiting altruism in response to fairness concerns (e.g., Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler 1986b) . Similarly, responders in ultimatum games often reject offers that are perceived to be unfair, thus incurring a cost to themselves in order to punish the proposer of the unfair offer (Oosterbeek, Sloof, and Van De Kuilen 2004) . In organizational settings, prior work suggests that agents are concerned with the fair distribution of outcomes (e.g., compensation) as well as with the fairness of the procedures for determining those outcomes (Greenberg 1986 ). Further, individuals expect compensation that accurately reflects their effort, ability, or contribution to the firm (Lind 2001) ; and related empirical evidence suggests that principals strive to offer contracts that agents will perceive as being fair. For example, Bol, Keune, Matsumura, and Shin (2010) provide evidence that supervisors set lower performance targets for employees who face higher store-specific risk and use discretion in target setting to increase the perceived fairness of performance-based pay.
In this section, we develop hypotheses about how agents' fairness perceptions are jointly influenced by (1) uncontrollable factors that influence their performance and (2) the state dependence of their performance-based contracts. We also examine potential implications of these fairness perceptions for the welfare of both principals and agents. 
Uncontrollable Factors, Contracting, and Fairness Perceptions
Agency theory indicates that information asymmetry prevents optimal risk sharing among principals and agents because these parties cannot contract directly on agents' effort (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Holmstrom 1979) . Instead, principals and agents must rely on outcome-based contracts to align agents' interests with those of the principals (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Holmstrom 1979; Eisenhardt 1985) . However, outcome-based contracts necessarily impose additional risk on agents by increasing the extent to which agents' compensation is influenced by factors outside of their control (Eisenhardt 1985) . If information about the state of nature is observable and contractible ex post, principals and agents can reduce the risk imposed upon agents by using state-dependent contracts that adjust agents' compensation for factors outside of the agents' control (Frederickson and Waller 2005) . For example, agents' performance-based 1 Throughout this paper, we use the term "fairness" to refer broadly to the extent to which agents' believe their compensation is determined or distributed in a manner that is impartial without favoritism or discrimination (i.e., we do not distinguish among more narrow definitions of fairness such as distributive fairness vs. procedural fairness). Further, we use the term "unfair" to refer to compensation that agents perceive to be less than is fair, as opposed to more than is fair, though we discuss the latter possibility as well in our analyses.
contracts could be structured such that performance-based pay is calculated using a lower rate when a favorable state of nature is realized and a higher rate when an unfavorable state of nature is realized.
2
Following contract acceptance, agency theory assumes that agents choose an action (e.g., an effort level) that, together with the state of nature and agents' ability, determines firm performance. The resulting payoff is then allocated among the principals and agents according to the terms of the contract. Thus, from a contracting perspective, the compensation that results from this contractual process is fair: agents accepted the contract, chose their actions, realized an outcome, and were compensated according to the terms of the contract.
3 However, because agents also believe that performance-based pay should reflect their effort and ability, they may view the compensation as unfair ex post, even if they accepted the contract and expected their compensation to be relatively fair ex ante. This discrepancy between agents' ex ante expectations (when the contract is accepted) and ex post perceptions (when the contract is fulfilled) could arise because agents do not believe, ex post, that the compensation accurately reflects the effort they exerted and ability they demonstrated given the circumstances they encountered. That is, due to uncontrollable factors in the performance environment, the compensation that ultimately results from an objective performance-based contract might be less than the amount that agents view as fair given their beliefs about their effort and ability. As a result, under a state-dependent contract, the state of nature will have a diminished impact on agents' attributions.
To the extent that agents believe their compensation was determined by internal factors (because outcomes were positive), agents are likely to view the compensation as relatively fair ex post. In contrast, to the extent that agents believe their compensation was determined by external factors (because outcomes were negative), agents are likely to view the compensation as being unfair ex post. Thus, despite accepting a contract and expecting relatively fair compensation ex ante, the extent to which individuals fall prey to a self-serving attribution bias could contribute to the ex post perceived unfairness predicted in our first hypothesis. Accordingly, we make the following two formal predictions:
H2a: Relative to a static contract, a state-dependent contract reduces agents' internal attributions when a favorable state of nature is realized and external attributions when an unfavorable state of nature is realized.
H2b: Agents' ex post perceptions of the fairness of their compensation will increase as agents attribute their performance to internal factors.
Deviation from Expectations
Importantly, while biased attributions could contribute to the effect predicted by H1, the prediction is not entirely dependent on finding support for H2a and H2b. Specifically, independent of agents' attributions, a performance-based contract and realized state of nature will often combine to result in compensation that is higher or lower than the compensation agents expected when they accepted the contract. For example, under a static contract, agents' compensation, on average, is likely to be predictably higher than expected when a favorable state of nature is realized and predictably lower than expected when an unfavorable state of nature is realized. In contrast, a state-dependent contract reduces the effect of the state of nature on compensation. As a result, while agents' realized compensation might still deviate from their ex ante expectation, the realized state of nature is less likely to affect the magnitude of that expectancy violation under a state-dependent contract.
When evaluating compensation outcomes, unfavorable discrepancies between actual compensation and expected compensation can lead to perceived unfairness (Austin et al. 1980 ).
Indeed, prior work suggests that individuals base their judgments of the fairness of outcomes on the degree to which those outcomes deviate from self-derived expectations of outcomes (Ordóñez et al. 2000; van den Bos et al. 1998 ). For example, Cherry et al. (2003) provide evidence that students judge the fairness of their grades based in part on expectancy matching: if grades fall short of expectations, students perceive the grade to be less fair.
Prior work has demonstrated an effect of outcomes deviating from expectations on fairness judgments in settings with a subjective component (e.g., grades). Inasmuch as this effect is driven partly by the uncertainty associated with subjective outcomes, expectancy violation will likely also affect fairness judgments in settings with uncertainty related to risk. While contract acceptance implies acceptance of the associated risk and uncertainty, agents are more likely to believe they have been sufficiently compensated for their effort and ability when their compensation meets or exceeds their expected compensation. Conversely, agents are more likely to believe they have been insufficiently compensated for their effort and ability when their compensation falls short of their expected compensation. Thus, agents' fairness perceptions are likely positively correlated with (signed) expectancy violation, such that compensation that falls below expectations (a negative expectancy violation) will be deemed to be less fair, and compensation that exceeds expectations (a positive expectancy violation) will be deemed to be more fair. Thus, we hypothesize the following:
H3a: Relative to a static contract, a state-dependent contract, on average, results in a less positive expectancy violation when a favorable state of nature is realized and a less negative expectancy violation when an unfavorable state of nature is realized.
H3b: Agents' ex post perceptions of the fairness of their compensation will be positively correlated with agents' expectancy violation (lower fairness with more negative expectancy violation, higher fairness with more positive expectancy violation).
Performance Misreporting
Combined, H1 and H2 predict a discrepancy between agents' ex ante fairness perceptions (when the contract is accepted) and their ex post fairness perceptions (after the contract is fulfilled). In general, prior work indicates that perceived unfairness in compensation can result in lower job satisfaction and motivation (Cohen-Charash and Spector 2001; Colquitt et al. 2001 ).
Further, If agents perceive their compensation as being unfair ex post, they may take actions to remediate this perceived unfairness (Carrell and Dittrich 1978; Henrich et al. 2004; Chen and Sandino 2012) . For example, Houser, Vetter, and Winter (2012) find that individuals who feel they are treated unfairly in a dictator game are more willing to cheat in a different game to increase their earnings. Worsham (1996) provides experimental evidence that unfair tax collection procedures may contribute to noncompliance with tax laws. Greenberg (1990) finds that employee theft is greater following a pay cut in manufacturing plants that is perceived to be unfair. Nagin, Rebitzer, Sanders, and Taylor (2002) find that call center employees are less likely to over-report their performance when they have more positive attitudes toward their employer.
And Chen and Sandino (2012) find that higher levels of employee compensation at convenience stores deter employee theft and reduce the instances of collusion among employees to steal.
This literature suggests that agents who have the opportunity to misreport their performance (and thereby increase their compensation) will be more likely to do so when they view their expected compensation as being unfair, even if they are being compensated objectively according to an agreed-upon contract.
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H4: Agents will engage in more performance over-reporting when they perceive their compensation to be less fair.
Inasmuch as the driver of performance over-reporting is fairness concerns, agents who misreport do so to correct what they perceive to be a fairness imbalance. Once corrected via misreporting, agents will likely perceive their compensation to be more fair. Thus, we expect agents who misreport and receive more compensation than warranted per the terms of the contract to perceive their compensation as more fair than agents under the same contract who do not misreport.
H5:
Agents who engage in more performance over-reporting will subsequently perceive their compensation as more fair.
III. METHODS
We test our hypotheses using two laboratory experiments in which participants used computers to work through self-guided instructions to perform tasks and answer questions. For Experiment 1, we recruited 93 students from a highly ranked university in the United States.
Forty-six percent of participants were male. For Experiment 2, we recruited 400 participants through Amazon Mechanical Turk. Fifty-four percent of participants were male. Participants in Experiment 1 completed the study in an average of 18 minutes and received an average payment of $8.30. Participants in Experiment 2 completed the study in an average of 17 minutes and received an average payment of $2.09. Experiments 1 and 2 provide data for testing H1, H2a, and H2b. Experiment 2 provides additional data for testing H3a, H3b, H4, and H5.
Experiment Design and Procedures
Figure 1 provides a depiction of the procedures used to administer Experiments 1 and 2.
After consenting to be part of the research study, participants in both experiments read instructions indicating that there will be two parts to the study. Each part involves a problemsolving task adapted from Mazar, Amir, and Ariely (2008) . Participants are presented with a series of grids consisting of three-digit numbers. Participants are told that for each grid they must find the two numbers that add up to 10. Part 1 consists of a three-minute practice round in which each grid has 12 numbers (3 x 4) (see Figure 2 , Panel A). Participants are told to solve as many problems as they can in the time allowed, and a timer at the top of the page counts down the time remaining. After three minutes, participants are informed how many problems they solved.
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Before beginning Part 2 of the study, participants are told that they will again be presented with number grids similar to those in Part 1. However, they are told that they will be randomly assigned to solve either all easy problems (3 x 3 grids, see Figure 2 Panel B) or all difficult problems (3 x 5 grids, see Figure 2 Panel C). Participants are shown samples of the easy and difficult problem grids and are told they will have eight minutes to solve as many problems as they can. Participants in Experiment 1 (Experiment 2) are also told that they will be paid $2 ($0.50) plus additional performance-based compensation for each problem they solve in Part 2.
The nature of this additional compensation is explained in detail to participants (discussed below). Before solving problems, participants in both experiments are asked to rate how fairly they will be compensated for participating in Part 2, and participants in Experiment 2 are asked to estimate the number of problems they believe they will solve if assigned to solve easy problems and if assigned to solve difficult problems. 5 Further, before proceeding, participants in Experiment 1 (Experiment 2) are given the opportunity to reject the pay-for-performance contract offered, end their participation in the study, and be paid the $2 ($0.50) for the time they have already spent, or accept the pay-for-performance contract in addition to the $2 ($0.50) for participating in Part 1. 6 Participants who opt to proceed then solve problems for eight minutes, with a timer at the top of the page indicating the time remaining.
After Part 2 of the study, participants again rate the fairness of their compensation. They also rate how much skill and ability, luck, task difficulty, and effort affected their performance in Part 2 of the study. Participants then rate how well they believe they did in the study and how difficult they thought the study was. Participants then answer two manipulation check questions, indicating whether they answered relatively easy or relative hard problems, and whether their pay rate depended on the difficulty of the problems they solved. Finally, participants answer demographic questions. Before completing the study, participants agree "not to discuss the details of this study in any way with anyone who may later participate in the study."
Independent Variables
Experiment 1 is a 2 (state of nature) by 2 (contract type) design. State of nature is manipulated at two levels: easy and difficult. Participants in the Easy condition solve problems that consist of a 3 x 3 grid of numbers, while participants in the Difficult condition solve puzzles that consist of a 3 x 5 grid of numbers. Participants do not know which state of nature they are randomly assigned to until beginning Part 2 of the study, though they are aware of the two difficulty conditions.
We manipulate contract type at two levels: static and state dependent. Participants in the Static Contract condition are told in the instructions for Part 2 that they will be paid $0.35 per puzzle solved in Part 2. Thus, the performance-based pay in the contract for these participants is independent of the state of nature. Participants in the State-Dependent Contract condition are told in the instructions for Part 2 that they will be paid $0.25 per puzzle if they are assigned to solve easy problems (the 3 x 3 grid), or $0.60 per puzzle if they are assigned to solve hard problems (the 3 x 5 grid). 7 Thus, the performance-based pay in the contract for these participants depends on the state of nature. Participants know and can accept or reject their contract before beginning Part 2; but they are not aware that other participants will be randomly assigned to a different contract type.
Experiment 2 is a 2 (contract type) by 2 (state of nature) by 2 (ability to misreport)
design. The contract type and state of nature manipulations are identical to Experiment 1, with the exception of the bonus pay rates. Participants in the Static Contract condition are told that they will be paid $0.10 per puzzle solved, while participants in the State-Dependent Contract condition are told they will be paid $0.07 per puzzle if assigned to solve easy problems, or $0.15 per puzzle if assigned to solve difficult problems. We manipulate the ability to misreport by telling participants in the Forced-Accuracy condition how many problems they solved at the end of Part 2 (as in Experiment 1), but asking participants in the Misreporting-Allowed condition to report how many problems they solved during the eight minutes of Part 2. 8 Performance-based compensation depends on the actual number of problems solved in the Forced-Accuracy condition, but depends on the number of problems participants report having solved in the Misreporting-Allowed condition.
7 Piece rates were chosen based on results from pilot studies such that participants' average compensation would be approximately equal in the Static and State-Dependent Contract conditions. 8 Because it may be difficult for participants to remember how many problems they solved, we allow participants to return to the problem-solving screen to count the number of puzzles they solved. While we cannot distinguish between intentional and unintentional misreporting, unintentional misreporting should be randomly distributed across conditions.
Dependent Variables
We elicit our primary dependent measure by asking participants in Experiment 1 to rate the fairness of their compensation before and after Part 2 of the study using a 101-point scale.
Specifically, participants answer the following question before Part 2 (ex ante fairness) and after Part 2 (ex post fairness): "In your opinion, how fairly will you be compensated for participating in Part 2 of this research study?" Participants select a rating from 0 ("Not at all Fairly") to 100
("Very Fairly").
To allow for a comparison in fairness perceptions between our participants in Experiment 1 and Experiment 2, participants in Experiment 2 rate fairness before Part 2 on the same scale as that used in Experiment 1. However, because some participants in Experiment 2 are allowed to misreport, we adjusted the fairness scale used after Part 2 (ex post fairness) to allow for the possibility that some participants, after misreporting, may perceive their compensation as being more than is fair. Thus, the fairness scale following Part 2 of Experiment 2 goes from a rating from 0 ("Less than Fairly") to 100 ("More than Fairly").
Additional Variables of Interest
Attribution: Similar to Libby and Rennekamp (2012) , participants answer four questions to determine the extent to which they believe internal factors (skill and ability and effort) and external factors (task difficulty and luck) affected their performance in the study. Expectancy Violation: In Experiment 2, participants provide estimates of the number of problems they expect to solve if assigned easy problems ("If you are assigned easy problems, how many do you think you will solve?") and if assigned difficult problems ("If you are assigned difficult problems, how many do you think you will solve?"). We use these estimates construct a measure of expected compensation by multiplying these estimates by the contract piece rates and averaging the products. Next, we calculate participants' expectancy violation by subtracting participants' expected compensation from their actual compensation, with positive (negative) values on this measure indicating participants were paid more (less) than they expected when they accepted the contract. In Experiment 1, participants in the Static Contract condition earned more compensation in the Easy condition than in the Difficult condition (p < 0.001, two-tailed, untabulated) while participants in the State-Dependent Contract condition earned marginally more compensation in the Difficult condition than in the Easy condition (p = 0.088, two-tailed, untabulated). This latter finding suggests that although the state-dependent contract reduced the effect of the state of nature on participants' compensation, the manipulation was stronger than intended. In Experiment 2, participants in the Static Contract condition earned more compensation in the Easy condition than in the Difficult condition (p < 0.001, two-tailed, untabulated), while the state of nature had no effect on participants' compensation in the State-Dependent Contract condition (p = 0.333, two-tailed, untabulated), consistent with an effective manipulation of contract type. Importantly, as discussed below, our results are robust to controlling for the amount of compensation earned by participants. 13 Results are qualitatively unchanged if we do not control for ex ante fairness. 14 As demonstrated in Panel C of Table 2 , the interactive effect of contract type and state of nature is robust to controlling for the compensation earned by participants, indicating that these effects are not simply due to participants believing that higher compensation is more fair. All told, our results from Experiments 1 and 2 provide support for H1.
IV. RESULTS

Preliminary Analyses and Manipulation Checks
Tests of H2a and H2b
H2a predicts that, relative to agents who accepted a static contract, agents who accepted a state-dependent contract will be less likely to attribute their performance to internal factors when a favorable state of nature is realized and less likely to attribute their performance to external factors when an unfavorable state of nature is realized. As indicated in Panel A of Table 3 , we find that contract type moderates the effect of the state of nature on participants' internal attributions in Experiment 1 (p = 0.012, one-tailed) but not in Experiment 2 (p = 0.212, onetailed). As indicated in Panel B of Table 3 , the interaction in Experiment 1 arises because when a favorable state of nature is realized, participants in the Static Contract condition attribute their performance to internal factors to a greater extent than participants in the State-Dependent 14 Though H1 does not have directional implications for the two remaining contrasts, we examine them for completeness. In both experiments, participants in the Static Contract condition provide significantly higher ex post fairness ratings in the Easy condition than in the Difficult condition (both p ≤ 0.003, two-tailed). For participants in the State-Dependent Contract condition there is no significant difference in participants' ex post fairness ratings in the Difficult condition relative to those of participants in the Easy condition (both p ≥ 0.225, two-tailed).
Contract condition (p = 0.088, one-tailed). In contrast, when an unfavorable state of nature is realized, participants in the Static Contract condition attribute their performance to external factors to a greater extent than participants in the State-Dependent Contract condition (p = 0.032, one-tailed).
[ INSERT TABLE 3] H2b predicts that agents' ex post perceptions of the fairness of their compensation will increase as agents' ex post tendency to attribute their performance to internal factors increases.
Consistent with this hypothesis, as indicated in Panel C of Table 3 , we find that participants' internal attributions have a positive effect on ex post fairness ratings in Experiment 1 (p = 0.052, one-tailed) and Experiment 2 (p < 0.001). This effect is robust to controlling for participants'
compensation (see Panel D of Table 3 ), indicating that participants' internal attributions incrementally affect their fairness perceptions beyond the effect of their compensation. Overall, across Experiments 1 and 2, we find support for H2.
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Tests of H3a and H3b
H3a predicts that, relative to agents who accepted a static contract, agents who accepted a state-dependent contract will experience a less positive expectancy violation when a favorable state of nature is realized and a less negative expectancy violation when an unfavorable state of nature is realized. As indicated in Panel A of Table 4 , we find that contract type moderates the effect of the state of nature on participants' expectancy violation (p < 0.001, one-tailed). As indicated in Panel B of Table 4 , we find that participants' expectancy violation has a positive effect on ex post fairness ratings (p < 0.001, one-tailed). As indicated in Panel D, the effects of participants' attributions and expectancy violation are both robust to controlling for participants' compensation, indicating that both incrementally affect agents' fairness perceptions beyond the effect of their compensation (both p ≤ 0.002, one-tailed). Overall, we find support for H3a and H3b, suggesting that, while participants viewed their expected compensation as relatively fair when they accepted the contract, they view negative deviations from that expected compensation to be unfair -even though those deviations were contractual. 
Tests of H4 and H5
H4 and H5 focus on one potential behavioral implication of our findings-namely, agents' propensity to misreport their performance. Table 5 H4 predicts that agents who perceive their compensation to be less fair will engage in more performance over-reporting in order to alleviate the perceived unfairness. Conceptually, H4
17 13 (of 173) participants in the Misreporting-Allowed condition underreported their performance. Inferences are unchanged if we treat these participants as if they did not misreport. 18 One observation was removed from our misreporting analyses because the number of problems correctly solved in Part 2 was lost due to a computer error, preventing us from calculating the amount of misreporting. Results of our tests of H1, H2, and H3 are qualitatively unchanged if we remove this observation from those analyses.
predicts that misreporting will be related to participants' fairness perceptions after they complete the task but before they report their performance. However, to avoid prompting participants to consider fairness immediately before their reporting decision, and to allow us to test whether agents who engage in more performance over-reporting subsequently perceive their compensation as more fair (H5) (2008) and use 10,000 bootstrap samples to test whether contract type and state of nature interact to affect misreporting through predicted pre-reporting fairness. The indirect effect on Misreporting Amount (Number of problems) and Misreporting Amount (Dollars) is marginally significant (z = -1.57, p = 0.059, one-tailed and z = -1.48, p = 0.070, one-tailed, respectively).
(Number of Problems) and Misreporting Amount (Dollars) on ex post fairness perceptions (p = 0.074 and p = 0.057 respectively, both one-tailed), supporting H5.
Interestingly, for participants who over-reported performance, untabulated results indicate that their ex post fairness ratings (mean = 71.54) were significantly above the midpoint of the scale (t(69) = 7.04; p < 0.001, two-tailed), suggesting that, on average, these participants viewed their compensation as being more than fair. Combined, these results suggest that participants' fairness concerns increased their propensity to over-report their performance but did not fully constrain over-reporters from taking advantage of the latitude available to increase their compensation more than they believed was fair.
V. CONCLUSION
In this study, we examine how contract state dependence and the realized state of nature combine to influence agents' perceptions of the fairness of compensation and how those fairness perceptions, in turn, influence agents' propensity to take an action-misreporting performancethat could negatively affect principals' welfare. Consistent with our predictions, we find that (1) when a favorable state of nature is realized, agents view their compensation as less fair when they are compensated according to a state-dependent contract that reduces the impact of the state of nature on their compensation, and (2) when an unfavorable state of nature is realized, agents view their compensation as being less fair when they are compensated according to a static contract that does not reduce the impact of the state of nature on their compensation. In addition, we find evidence that agents' internal attributions and expectancy violations contribute to this effect. We also provide evidence that agents' fairness perceptions influence their decision to misreport their performance and that over-reporting reduces the extent to which they view their compensation as being unfair.
These findings extend prior work by providing evidence that when an unfavorable state of nature is realized, agents believe it is unfair for their compensation to be decreased by uncontrollable factors, even though they agreed to bear that risk when they accepted a static contract. Conversely, when a favorable state of nature is realized, agents believe it is unfair if uncontrollable factors do not increase their compensation, even though they agreed not to reap that benefit when they accepted a state-dependent contract. These asymmetric fairness perceptions, in turn, can lead agents to take actions (e.g., performance misreporting) that adversely affect the welfare of principals and could contribute to the asymmetric "pay-for-luck" observed empirically.
Our study is subject to limitations that provide opportunities for future research. For example, we focus on one specific adverse action that agents could take to remediate perceived unfairness (misreporting). Future work might investigate other potential remediating actions that agents might take (e.g., reduce future effort, increase consumption of perquisites, etc.). In addition, we found that participants in Experiment 2 perceived the state-dependent contract as more fair ex ante than the static contract, but participants in Experiment 1 did not perceive a significant difference between the two contracts. One possible explanation for this difference is the difference in subject pools. Given the nature of their work and their experience with different types of compensation contracts, including performance-based incentives, Mechanical Turk workers may be better calibrated to good and bad contracts than the average student.
There are several other promising avenues for future work related to this study. For example, our study suggests there is inconsistency between individuals' ex ante and ex post fairness perceptions. Future work might examine how this inconsistency can be mitigated. For example, it's possible that simply informing individuals of this shift in fairness perceptions might reduce this inconsistency. Alternatively, providing individuals with a choice between a statedependent and static contract might lead them to take ownership of their risk exposure. Future work might also examine other negative behavior that can result from perceived unfairness or examine contracting in a more dynamic setting among principals and agents.
Figure 1
Following is a depiction of the procedures used to administer Experiments 1 and 2.
Participants are informed that the research study will consist of two parts.
Participants are provided with instructions for Part 1 in which participants have three minutes to solve as many 3x4 grids (see Figure 2 Panel A) as possible. Participants complete Part 1 and are told how many problems they solved.
Participants are provided with instructions for Part 2. Participants are informed that Part 2 will either consist of all easy problems (3x3 grids, see Figure 2 Panel B) or all difficult problems (3x5 grids, see Figure 2 Panel C). A sample easy problem and sample difficult problem is presented.
Participants are randomly assigned to a static contract (with a fixed piece rate) or a statedependent contract (with a lower piece rate if a favorable state of nature is realized and a higher piece rate if an unfavorable state of nature is realized). Participants provide ex ante fairness ratings and are given the opportunity to (1) reject the contract and receive flat-wage compensation for participating in Part 1 or (2) accept the contract and receive performancebased compensation for participating in Part 2 (in addition to the flat-wage compensation for participating in Part 1). Participants in Experiment 2 also provide estimates of the number of problems they expect to solve if assigned easy vs. difficult problems.
Participants who accept the contract are randomly assigned to the easy or difficult condition and complete Part 2 in which participants have eight minutes to solve as many grids as possible.
Participants who are randomly assigned to a Forced-Accuracy or a Misreporting-Allowed condition (Experiment 2 only). Those in the Misreporting-Allowed condition are asked to count and report the number of problems they solved correctly. Participants in the Forced-Accuracy condition are informed how many problems they solved correctly.
Compensation is calculated and presented to participants. Participants provide ex post fairness ratings, respond to remaining measures, and answer demographic questions.
Figure 2
Participants in our experiments were presented with a series of grids consisting of three-digit numbers as displayed in Panels A, B, and C, below. Participants are told that for each grid they must find the two numbers that add up to 10.
Panel A. Practice-Round Sample Problem
Part 1 of Experiments 1 and 2 consisted of a three-minute practice round in which participants were instructed to solve as many 12-number puzzles (3 x 4 grids, as seen below) as possible.
Panel B. Easy Condition Sample Problem
Part 2 of Experiments 1 and 2 consisted of an eight-minute round in which participants were instructed to solve as many puzzles as possible. Participants were randomly assigned to solve all easy or all difficulty puzzles. Participants assigned to solve all easy puzzles solved 9-number puzzles (3 x 3 grids, as seen below).
Panel C. Difficult Condition Sample Problem
Part 2 of Experiment 1 and 2 consisted of an eight-minute round in which participants were instructed to solve as many puzzles as possible. Participants were randomly assigned to solve all easy or all difficult puzzles. Participants assigned to solve all difficult puzzles solved 15-number puzzles (3 x 5 grids, as seen below). Participants are presented with a series of grids consisting of three-digit numbers and are instructed that for each grid, they must find the two numbers that add up to 10. Participants first complete a three-minute practice round in which problems contain 12 numbers. Following the practice round, participants are informed that they will solve a second set of problems, and that the problems will be either relatively easy or relatively difficult. In the Easy condition, participants solve relatively easy problems that contain 9 numbers. In the Difficult condition, participants solve relatively difficult problems that contain 15 numbers. In the Static Contract condition, participants receive the same rate of pay regardless of the realized state of nature (easy vs. difficult problems). In the State-Dependent Contract condition, participants receive a higher rate of pay (per problem solved) when they are randomly assigned to the Difficult condition and a lower rate of pay (per problem solved) when they are randomly assigned to the Easy condition.
Variable Definitions:
a Practice Score: The number of problems correctly solved during the three-minute practice round. f Compensation: The total pay received by participants for completing the study.
g Expectancy Violation:
The difference between participants' actual compensation and their ex ante expected compensation. Participants' ex ante expected compensation is estimated by averaging the product of participants' contract piece rates times their estimates of how many problems they will solve if assigned to solve easy problems or if assigned to solve difficult problems. Participants in the Misreporting-Allowed condition were asked to report how many problems they solved during the task and were compensated according to this reported number rather than the actual number of problems solved. Misreporting Amount (Number of Problems) is calculated as the difference between participants reported and actual number of problems solved. Misreporting Amount (Dollars) is calculated as the difference between participants' actual compensation (based on the number of problems participants reported that they solved) and their contractual compensation (based on the number of problems participants actually solved). Panel B presents ANOVA tests of the effect of ex ante fairness on the amount of misreporting, and Panel C presents ANOVA tests of the effect of predicted pre-reporting fairness on the amount of misreporting. To estimate predicted pre-reporting fairness, we regressing ex post fairness for participants in the Forced-Accuracy condition on ex ante fairness, contract type, state of nature, internal attributions, the number of problems solved in the practice round, and the number of problems solved in Round 2. We use the coefficients from this model to estimate pre-misreporting ex post fairness for participants in the Misreporting-Allowed condition. Panel D presents ANCOVA tests of the effect of misreporting on participants' ex post fairness ratings. See Table 1 for additional variable definitions.
